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SLOUCHING TOWARD CHICAGO:
REGULATORY REFORM AS
REVEALED RELIGION
By R.G. EVANS*
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?

W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming

Economists have rather a guilty conscience about values. Many of them
aspire to a "scientific" form of analysis, a discipline built solely on positive
propositions about how economies function. Such a collection of descriptive,
causal statements, "if A, then B," would serve as the foundation of all policy
analysis. Normative propositions,--one (society, the government) ought to
do A,-would then follow from the choice of B as a valued objective.
Economists might recommend A as policy, but strictly speaking their functions as scientific economists end once they have demonstrated the causal
linkage from A to B. Their values with respect to B stand on the same footing as those of any other citizen. The role played by the "scientific" economist in policy formation is simply that of establishing the menu of possible
choices, the framework of positive constraints, from which a society makes
its selections."
The commitment to positive methodology is itself a value strongly held
and advocated or preached by a number of economists, although it is interesting that those who profess positivism most loudly are often those who
recommend particular policies most energetically.2 But in fact the possibility
of such a radical separation between "is"and "ought" in economics is
illusory.
In the first place, as Schumpeter noted, ideology "enters on the very
ground floor, into the preanalytical cognitive act."'3 What we choose to study,

© Copyright, 1982, R.G. Evans.
* Department of Economics, University of British Columbia.
1
Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (London:
MacMillan, 1932), though the idea goes back at least to Mill.
2 E.g., Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics" in Friedman, ed.,
Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).
3 History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954) at 42.
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how we define the essential properties of the objects of analysis, and what
we think are their significant, as opposed to incidental, inter-relationships, all
depend on our value systems. We begin the positive analysis with a "model"
in the broad sense, which establishes intellectual categories, defines boundaries between different phenomena, and in a world where everything depends
on everything else in several ways, suggests which sets of dependencies are

likely to be worth investigating and which are likely to be accidental correlations. Thus, unfortunately for "scientific" economics, the values are built
in before the positive analysis begins. And these values are culturally conditioned, as is strikingly demonstrated by the major differences in underlying
models and in research programmes followed in different countries in "the
4
same" sub-disciplines of economics.
But the impact of values on analysis extends well beyond the pre-

analytic phase. The generation and testing of self-sustaining positive propositions, whose validity can be demonstrated either absolutely or probabilistically so as to command universal assent even among economists, turns out
to be beyond our capacity. Despite advances in computational, statistical,
or mathematical technique, there is no evidence that the situation is improving. We learn more about particular situations, but the "laws of motion" of
society elude us. The central methodological problem appears to be that
pointed out some years ago by Heracleitus, developed in more detail by
Georgescu-Roegen. 5 Positive analysis in practice always embodies a number

of simplifying assumptions, empirical judgments, and often just plain
guesses, to move it across the gaps in which empirical evidence is missing,
or more commonly ambiguous. In this process, of course, value judgments
play an inevitable role."

4 Dobb, Theories of Value and Distribution Since Adam Smith: Ideology and Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) at Chapter 1.
5 Heracleitus pointed out that any model which is sufficiently complex to replicate
the behaviour of an economic system or of its sub-components will contain a large
number of parameters, which in turn will require a large number of observations for
their estimation. But this requires either a long time-period of stable structure or a large
number of comparable regimes with similar structures. And since history or diversity
are constantly changing all such parameters, the process of econometric estimation of a
large and complex economic model embodies an "act of faith" that its parameters have
been "stable enough" - or have varied only in measured ways, - so as to support
estimation. But the parameters represent (measure) behaviour; which is inside history
in a way the model itself can never be. Thus structure is constantly changing, and the
more complex the model, the more implausible the stability assumptions. Or he may
have. His views are summarized in the phrase, "panta rhei, ouden menei," attributed
to him by Aristotle. See also Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Lmv and the Economic
Process (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
IMyrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1969). The problem is not unique to economics; Tuohy in
Regulation and Scientific Complexity: Decision Rules and Processes in the Occupational
Health Hazard Arena (1982), 20 Osgoode Hall LJ. 562, refers to "trans-scientific issues",
namely, questions which can be posed as positive, "scientific" problems, but which cannot
be resolved, at present or ever, scientifically. Wicksell, in commenting on the inability of
economics to arrive at settled conclusions, drew the religious parallel; "like theology
and for approximately the same reasons" economics has failed to arrive at generally
accepted results (Inaugural Lecture, University of Lund, quoted by Myrdal, op. cit. at
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One response to this difficulty, discussed by Archibald in the context
of the "realism of assumptions" debate, is to moderate the positivist programme
by explicit recognition that unambiguous testing of theory in economics is
impossible. Instead one can strive for "realism" of both assumptions and
conclusions by a process of observation of as wide a range of evidence as
possible, and by highlighting the judgmental components and making the
7
value judgments as explicit and open as possible.
An alternative, however, is to follow the sermon notes of the legendary
Scottish preacher coping with the problem of the origin of evil-"This point
very doubtful-Shout Loudly!!" In economic analysis this takes the form of
assigning normative significance to positive propositions themselves. One
ought to believe that A implies B. And indeed the development of schools of
thought in economic analysis seems to take place around particular sets of
positive propositions that are held as items of belief. Free markets, or governments, are alleged to function in certain ways, and if the evidence for such
propositions
is ambiguous, then assent to the proposition becomes an article
8
of faith.
The assignment of normative significance to positive propositions has
great functional value. The individual or group that can set the menu or
define the constraints for social choice in economic policy may wield
enormous political power. If this set of constraints were as unambiguously
established as an astronomical prediction about sunrise, then the analyst's
power would be illusory; he would merely be a conduit transmitting the laws
of nature. But there are few if any such "laws" in economics. (Astronomers
do not argue bitterly over the expected time of tomorrow's sunrise.)
The "scientific" analyst, in claiming such neutral status, is usually supporting a set of normative judgments as well, which either underlie or
interpenetrate the positive analysis. And these normative judgments are
often of fundamental importance. Cost-benefit analysts, for example, frequently make "scientific" judgments about the value of a human life that
are hidden in the footnotes or the technical appendix. (What is ironic is that
xiv). But he attributed the difficulty to disagreement over ends and goals of policy.
Myrdal's criticism seems well taken. If the problem were only value conflicts, positive
propositions would still command wide assent. Hawks and peaceniks do not disagree
about nuclear physics. But in economics, like theology, certain critical pieces of evidence
are always lacking, or inadequate, and bridges across such gaps are constructed in both
fields from wishes, hopes, and fears.
7 Refutation or Comparison? (1966), 17 Brit. J. Phil. Sci. See also Friedman, supra
note 2; Nagel, Assupmptions in Economic Theory (1963), 53 Amer. Econ. Rev. 211;
Samuelson, Discussion (1963), 53 Amer. Econ. Rev. 231.
8 The development of this faith is, I think, the process which Salter, in The Value
Debate in Regulation (1982), 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 485, describes as a progression from
theoretical, to ideological and finally to symbolic logic. Symbolic logic is characterized by
"highlighting, that is lifting from theory or ideological discussion for that matter,
some elements of the analysis and treating these elements as significant in and of themselves" [and by] "analogical reasoning... [without] a full empirical and theoretical
referent," id. at 490. Myrdal, supra note 6, at 19 quotes Westergaard speaking of economics as "a science where expressions and metaphors readily engender supposed
proofs." Economic analyses of regulation seem particularly prone to this weakness.
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even on their own terms they get the measure wrong!9 ) But the status of
the analyst, and his claim to a special role in policy-making, depends on the
perception by the rest of the community that the process of analysis is
scientific, and "value-free". The positivist claim is thus central to the advancement of the normative interests embedded in the analysis and to the
maintenance of a social role for the analyst as something other than a
"hired gun" or public relations agent for openly identified interests.1" Hence
the niormative significance attached by analysts to the acceptance of particular positive propositions, independent of the quality of the evidence for
them.
Indeed the social importance of apparently positive propositions is such
that they may be ultimately rendered immune to attack by being embedded in
completely circular theories, whose intellectual content is thus nil but whose
political appeal is very powerful. At this point, economic analysis meets
religion. The faith of Pangloss in Divine Providence is held up to ridicule
because it cannot be assailed in any other way. Once one assumes that the
world is in fact ruled by Divine Providence, it follows that whatever happens
is for the best and cannot be improved. No empirical evidence will serve as
refutation, one can only laugh. The similarity to theories of fully informed
rational consumers freely transacting in perfectly competitive markets is not
accidental. Both are rooted in the same "natural law" tradition, whose
foundations are theological, not empirical." More generally, however, one
finds in (some) religions great normative importance attached to particular
apparently positive propositions. Pagels analyses the conflict in the early
Christian church between orthodox Catholics and various forms of Gnostics
over such issues as whether Christ was crucified and died in the flesh, or

9 The number of cost-benefit analyses that have used estimated values of livelihood
streams as a value for lives is to large and too depressing to justify individual citation.
If this were the appropriate measure, the social convention in catastrophe would be
"women and children last", and euthanasia of the elderly would be by an overwhelming
margin our most cost-effective public health program. But you cannot fool all of the
people all of the time; see the discussion by Tuohy, supra note 6, of the declining credibility of cost-benefit analysis.
10 Economists have, until recently, been predominantly academics with aspirations
to scholarship - no insignificant number may indeed be called scholars. The "hired
gun" or public relations role is professionally offensive, being generally considered inconsistent with the pursuit of "truth" or at least of knowledge with some degree of
objectivity. For those who come to economics from a legal background, however,
adversarial preceedings are perceived more favourably as an investigative approach, and
the "hired gun" role seems more comfortable. The analyst-as-advocate is not constrained by the same intellectual rules as the academic; he deliberately makes the best
case that selected evidence and plausible analysis will support. The adversarial process
itself is supposed to ensure that inconsistent argument and invalid or distorted evidence
will be exposed. The tensions between the roles of lawyer-as-scholar and lawyer-asadvocate for whomever pays the fee may become more familiar to economists as the
sources of support for analysis shift from universities to clients (public or increasingly
private) whose interests are unambiguously adversarial, not intellectual.
11 Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1979); see also Dobb, supra note 4, at 41. Nor is the linkage
from theology to natural law to economic policy of historical interest only; Gordon, The
PoliticalEconomy of F.A. Hayek (1981), 14 Can. J. Econ. 470 at 476-479.
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whether the whole transaction was a spiritual shadow play. 12 What was
required of the orthodox was neither a positive view (I think, on the basis
of the evidence that a physical death occurred) nor a normative one (it
is a good thing for us, that Christ died... etc.), but rather belief-certain
propositions must be accepted as fact if one is to go to heaven. The Apostles'
Creed contains a mixture of testable and non-testable propositions, but the
whole must be accepted on faith as literally true, and this, rather than the
acceptance of normative principles of good and bad conduct, separates
sheep from goats. Moral uprightness by itself does not lead to heaven;
religion (or at least Christianity) was not and is not now simply a code of
conduct.
But the attachment of normative significance to positive propositions is
consistent with social and organizational objectives. The Creed was of
central importance to the interests of the church as an organizational entity
as well as serving to advance the values that Christianity embodied. In the
same way, assent to various positive propositions about how economies
function serves to maintain the organizational coherence and social status of
economists-for a time at least-as well as advancing the values and
interests that are smuggled into the positivist analysis. From this perspective
it ceases to be surprising that the most ardent advocates of a positivist
programme of methodology in economic research are also among the most
strident and self-confident proponents of radical policy change. When the
issue is doubtful, speak loudly.
The mix of value and fact, of ought and is, is inevitable in all economic
analysis. Purely formal, mathematical exercises may appear immune, but
these only become economic analysis when they are superimposed upon
some actual economy and that superposition cannot be value-free. The
mathematical entities must be assigned real-life "objective correlatives"- a
discretionary and judgmental process. It would thus be rather naive to
imagine that the application of economic analysis to issues in the public
regulation of economic activity, or any other field of policy, would permit
objective "scientific" discussion and the generation of value-free conclusions
Hume; or in
as to appropriate action. Economics does not transcend
3
Archibald's paraphrase, "No Ethics In, No Ethics Out.'
In fact, the very identification of "regulation" as a separate area of
public economic policy itself rests on certain implicit value judgments about
the proper or "normal" role of the state in economic life. It presupposes a
system of private market institutions which under normal circumstances
governs the economic processes of production, distribution, and exchange.
The state intervenes in particular situations with authoritative, and ultimately
coercive, "regulations" which compel people or organizations to behave in
ways they would otherwise not choose to do. Such regulatory intervention
may be justified in particular circumstances; what those circumstances might
be forms a large part of the economics of regulation. But given an underThd Gnostic Gospels (New York: Random House, 1979).
13 University of British Columbia, oral tradition. See also Dobb, supra note 4.
12
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lying system of values which include individualism and freedom from
compulsion, there is an implicit bias, a prior presumption, that places the
burden of justification on the proponents of the regulatory intervention, not
the free market alternative.
Yet the distinction between the regulatory activities of the state, and
economic policy in general, is far from clear. Most people would recognize
as regulation the passage of a law or regulation by a duly constituted
governing body, or its delegates, mandating or prohibiting specific actions.
But specific taxes, tariffs, or subsidies can achieve similar results. The
delegation of "self-regulatory" powers to occupations or supply-managing
groups of producers (agricultural marketing boards, taxi-cabs) is clearly
public regulation at one remove, as is the formation of public corporations
-Air Canada, Petrocan, provincial liquor boards. General macro-economic
policy, monetary and fiscal, is not usually referred to as economic regulation,
yet all sorts of industry or group specific benefits and burdens are implicit
in such policy, and many are explicit.
If we focus on the fact that regulations, by changing the opportunities
faced by individuals, serve to redistribute wealth or property rights, then it
is undeniable that regulation is a form of taxation; it is equally a form of
expenditure or transfer payment. 14 But then so is every other form of public
economic policy, the tax-transfer effects of an anti-inflationary policy of
high interest rates being an obvious example.
It does not follow, of course, that since all forms of public economic
policy redistribute property rights, therefore "each... is... a close substitute
for each of the others."'15 Coal, oil, natural gas, wood, and lard are all forms
of energy, yet one cannot put lumps of coal in the gas tank of a car, or
gasoline in a home furnace. Economic instruments have different comparative advantages, as well as side effects. But the separation of government
"regulation" from economic policy in general seems to presuppose some
definition of public economic activity that is not regulatory, not interven14 "For regulation, in its broadest sense, is the essential function of government.
Indeed taxation and expenditures, the other two principal instrumentalities, can be
thought of as special cases of regulation." Hartle, Public Policy Decision Making and
Regulation (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1979) at 1. Posner,
Taxation by Regulation (1971), 2 Bell J. of Eco. Mgmt. Sci. 22, focuses on its relation
to taxation in redistributing property rights; Hartle's perspective is broader.
15 Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and Confiscation (1982), 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 433.
The allegation of "close" substitutability permits a verbal transition from regulation as
being like taxation, i.e. taking "property", to "confiscation", described as a "prima facie
wrong" (pp. 436 - and finally to "illegitimate tax regulation" (449)). But of course regulation redistributes property rights, rather than "confiscating" them, and the "illegality"
refers to processes which are in accordance with law. The "prima facie wrong" is
apparently relative to some natural law standard, while illegal means not counter to
law as it is, but counter to law as the author feels it should be. Such personal preferences presumably refer to natural law again, that "diseased and meretricious old
drab" (Gordon, supra note 11, at 479) which serves so readily as a device to "smuggle
authoritarianism in under the cloak of 'nature'." Epstein recognizes as valid authority
neither duly elected legislatures nor courts; he appears willing, like Hayek, to sacrifice democratic process to an ideal of freedom - as defined by... ? Quis custodiet?
remains unanswered. (As, for that matter, does Cui Bono?)
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tionist, a "natural" level to which "deregulation" would return us. How
that level might be determined is obscure.
Regulation is clearly not everything beyond "anarchy plus a constable"
-quite apart from who employs and directs the constable. The idea that the
adjudication of property rights and enforcement of contract is somehow nonregulatory, or that one pattern of tax policy or money supply determination
represents "regulation" and another does not, requires some concept of a
pattern of economic intercourse prior to, or separate from, any form of
public regulatory policy. This is certainly fallacious history, and bad, though
common, economics-I believe it is also bad law. It would seem that the
examination of values in the regulatory process cannot proceed independently
of their more general role in economic policy.
And indeed we do find a substantial correlation of attitudes toward
macro-economic policies-fiscal, monetary, trade,-with views on "regulatory" policy more narrowly defined. Particularly among the more outspoken universal "deregulationists," it is apparent that the analysis of any
particular market or industry is dominated by a more general set of value
judgments about the "natural," usually minimal, role of the public sector
in economic, or any other, activity. Whatever the state does in the economic
sphere (or out of it) will reassign property rights and influence patterns of
economic behaviour, and any debate over what the state should or should
not do in this regard, whether or not conducted in the rhetoric peculiar to
any particular discipline, will involve such conflicting value propositions.
In such debates economic rhetoric has been particularly prominent,
because economists have worked out a very detailed set of formal theoretical propositions about how transactors interact with each other in the
economic sphere in the absence of formal direction. Their insights as to how
systems of prices can in theory, and often do in practice, serve as decentralized co-ordinating mechanisms, providing "solutions" to otherwise
hideously complex social problems of resource allocation and distribution,
suggest that broad areas of activity can be carried on not only adequately,
but, indeed on fairly general criteria, more satisfactorily, independent of
detailed state planning and intervention. Under specific circumstances, the
price system both conveys information and generates incentives to govern
the behaviour of transactors in a detailed and sensitive way. The appeal of
such decentralized systems is both functional and, to their students, aesthetic.
They also provide powerful support for pre-existing political or philosophical
value judgments about the nature of man and the proper forms of social
interaction.
In fact, however, theoretical economics does not in itself provide
support for either regulation or deregulation. The famous two "fundamental
theorems" of welfare economics demonstrate only that, under fairly restrictive conditions, all competitive equilibria are Pareto-optimal and, under
even more restrictive conditions, all Pareto-optima are competitive equilibria.
In other words, in a society in which all resource allocation is determined by the behaviour of atomistic, self-interested, perfectly competitive,
and fully informed transactors who take prices as parametric, and in which
prices adjust freely, and where prices and markets exist for all present and
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future commodities, specific to any uncertain state of nature, then a competitive equilibrium if it exists will be such that no one can be made better off
without making someone else worse off (the first theorem). Whether such an
equilibrium will in fact be reached is another matter. If it is, however, it is
optimal in the limited sense that no improvement is possible without sacrificing someone's interests to someone else's. If an economic outcome is not
Pareto-optimal, there exists some other outcome that everyone would prefer.
Secondly, if in addition, household preferences and firm technologies
satisfy convexity conditions, then any such Pareto-optimal position can be
reached by competitive processes in free markets from some specific initial
allocation of resource endowments or property rights (the second theorem).
If costless, lump-sum transfers of property rights can be carried out under
full information, then any desired Pareto point can, if technically feasible, be
reached from any initial rights allocation by a combination of lump-sum
transfers and competitive market processes.
While interesting, these results by themselves generate no policy implications whatever ("No ethics in, no ethics out" again). There are many
"Pareto-optimal" equalibria, including income/wealth/welfare distributions
across the members of a society ranging from completely egalitarian to as
unequal as one's index will allow. It is stressed in general equilibrium theory
that the pattern of resource allocation and distribution represented by an
arbitrarily chosen Pareto-optimal point is not in general "better" than an
arbitrary non-Pareto point on whatever criterion is employed for ranking
different outcomes. What is true is that, under stringent assumptions as to
how individual and group preferences are formed, there will for any nonPareto pattern of prices and distribution be some Pareto point(s) which is
superior in the sense that some agent(s) has been made better off while
no one has been made worse off; but it is simply an error to assume that if
one is at a non-Pareto point, perfectly competitive prices and markets will
lead to a better Pareto point. They will get to some Pareto point, but not
necessarily a better one. The second theorem does say that any desired outcome can be achieved through competitive markets, but only if the initial
property rights distribution is such as to yield that outcome. This in turn
suggests that if one could flexibly re-allocate property rights a&initio, and
if the other conditions held, then there would be a strong case for unregulated, freely competitive markets as a set of6 institutions for allocating
resources. But if not, such a case would not exist.1
But economic analysis itself does not, and cannot, say anything about
the appropriate distribution of either property rights or final outcomes. These
are value questions pure and simple. Nor does economic theory say anything
about the relative political feasibility of ex ante redistribution of property
rights versus ex post re-allocation of output through interference in private
markets. It is important to stress this fact, because occasionally claims are
made that "scientific" economic analysis can provide a basis, other than
IDOf course, in order to reallocate rights in the first place, one would need to
know the entire relationship between initial endowments and final distribution, which
raises the question as to what purpose is served by the intermediate market game?
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social value judgments, for particular patterns of income or wealth distribution.
These attempts form part of a historical sequence. The Norman baron
replied to Edward's commissioners of Quo Warranto that he held his land
from his grandfather, who had carried his sword with William the Bastard.
As the dynamic instability of this source of rights was fairly clear, the
justification for a particular distribution began to shift from might of king
to Will of God. Stations in life became divinely ordained. As God's Will
became less clear, "natural" rights emerged instead. The appeal to economics
as a source of such natural right was based a century or so ago on marginal
productivity theory, until it was recognized that marginal products in value
terms are dependent on relative prices, which in turn depend on the
initial rights distribution. Prices, and therefore marginal productivities, are
17
endogenous. '
There is limited ethical appeal to a system in which the distribution
of welfare depends critically on unpredictable factors beyond the control of
individuals; not merely endowments-heredity and inheritance-but more
importantly the effects of shifts in demand, supply, and technology. Services
and resources that had a high marginal productivity yesterday may have
none tomorrow. And while the investor in physical capital can diversify
the portfolio to achieve a desired risk level, the investor in human capital
is required to bet most of his net worth on the assumption that the marginal
productivity of that human capital will be maintained. It is obviously to the
economic advantage of society generally that resource allocation adapt
quickly and smoothly to changes in resource availability, tastes, and technology, but transitional costs are inevitable. Resource suppliers may have to
take decisions with very long term consequences, at a point when a reasonable man could not have been expected to make a better judgment. The
decision to enter an occupation with a long training period and specialized
skills is an important example. Subsequent technological or market shifts
may dramaticaly reduce the value of that investment. But to argue that all
the costs of such adjustments should be borne by those who guessed wrong,
and that such a redistribution, involving a large part of an individual's livelihood, is ethically attractive, seems to confuse a sin with a mistake.
More recently, a rather peculiar allegation has been made that a
property lights distribution can be derived from considerations of transactions costs. An attempt to substantiate the claim turns out to apply,
however, only to property rights in one's own person and powers, leaving
all other forms of rights to property unassigned, and in fact fails even there
to do more than assert a "natural" distribution-a predictable result because
economics possesses no settled theory of transactions costs. 18 Even if it did,
17This recognition is general, but not universal; there are still some who appear to
believe that marginal productivity creates some ethical claim to output; see discussion in
Friedman, Price Theory: A Provisional Text (Chicago: Aldine, 1968) at 196-198.
18 Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory (1979), 8 Legal Studies
103, the attempt to foist responsibility for the initial rights distribution onto "the
economist" (p. 125), is certainly novel.
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those costs would still be defined in terms of relative prices that are endogenously dependent on the rights distribution itself. Economic theory will
not exorcise Hume; the white coats of "science" may cover value judgments but cannot substitute for them.
A formal framework may, however, serve to display clearly the range of
different value judgments that must be made prior to or during the discussion of economic policy. The concept of the social welfare function (SWF),
hypothesized as some form of aggregator across the individual interests in
a society, is useful in this regard. "Ought" statements about economic policy
can then be interpreted as judgments about actions that will increase the
social welfare function; "optimal" policy is defined as that which maximizes
such a function.
But formalism introduces no new information. Indeed, the SWF as aggregator of individual interests is a restrictive sub-class of more general
SWFs, under the assumption that society's welfare, insofar as it can be
thought of at all, is some function of that of its component individuals,
rather than being specified by the ruling Deity or Party. There is no a priori
reason why a society should hold such individual-respecting views-but ours
appears to do so. Thus we write: W=F(U1 (Xi... Xi ... Xm1) ... U.
(Xl... Xi... X ) ... U n (X .. Xnj... Xn)), which means simply that
the overall society is composed of "n" individuals, each of whom has preferences defined over the amounts received, used, owned, perceived by him
of "in" different entities. Thus X! is the amount entity X. that is somehow
assigned to person i, and U1 is the welfare level of person i conditional on the
goods
pattern X.J When X.3 is a "good", then more X .3 increases U.-more
1
are good-but X! can equally be a "bad" to i-acid rain on his cottage.
Then the function J F somehow aggregates all the U, into a global social welfare level W, and "good" economic policy is that which maximizes F. The
maximization takes place, however, under a global production constraint linking the various Xj; the resources available to society limit output and impose
tradeoffs. More Xj implies less Xk, once a technical efficiency frontier has
been reached.' 9
This structure highlights two different levels of value judgments that
are implicit or explicit in any discussion of economic policy, regulation
included. The first is the structure of F, which includes the range of i. Who
is included in n, and with what weights are they aggregated in F? (Noninclusion implies zero weight.)
Economic analysis generally ignores the issue of the range of i, taking
for granted that it is defined by and across some social or political unit.
Market processes implicitly count people according to their wealth, that is,
their initial resource endowments valued at equilibrium prices. Recently
there has been a suggestion that weights based on wealth have ethical content as well, which yields the result that persons with insufficient wealth to
19 1 am here abstracting from externalities in production, either positive or
negative, which would simply complicate the discussion without affecting the argument.
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sustain life should be dropped out of the SWF except insofar as their wellbeing enters some other, wealthier, person's utility function°---which Archibald and Donaldson call the "Dog and Master" approach to income distribution. 21 The notion can be stretched further, inheritance may be "justified"
as respecting the wishes of the dead. This then implies that the set i includes
dead persons, so long as they "possess" wealth, as well as excluding those
of the living who do not.P It is hard to imagine a wide appeal for such a
set of value judgments, once made explicit. In any case the basis for them
cannot be found in economic analysis, which takes the boundaries of i and
the structure of F as predetermined. Markets were made to serve man, not
man to serve markets. Perhaps support for such ethical judgments could be
found in some Plutonian theology, but it would certainly not be congruent
with any of the major religions. "Natural" morality of course stretches to
fit the values of the proposer.2 3
Second, and at least as important, is the judgment as to what should
be included in the sets X. This in turn includes two types of decisions:
(1) what shall j span? and (ii) which elements of j enter particular U1 ( )?
The second issue, in the form of externalities in consumption or interactive
utility functions, has received considerable study-one individual's welfare
may depend on that of others, [U1 (Uk)] (non-paternalistic altruism) or on
others' specific consumption patterns, [U(Xk)]. This last could be because
k's stereo keeps i awake, or because i regrets k's use of cigarettes and the
consequent damage to k's health (paternalistic altruism).
Such interactions, whatever their form, are positive questions, people's
preferences either do or do not display these characteristics. But it blends
2

Posner, supra note 18, at 128. Posner, however, rejects the Paretian framework
in favour of a SWF that maximizes "wealth", a formulation which is somewhat obscure
since it cannot be done. His approach involves a confusion between general and partial
equilibrum. It is possible to maximize an expression W = P I X where P is an exogenous
price vector, X a vector of resource/output allocations, and W a global wealth measure;
it is then also possible to make individual Xi and Xj allocations so as to increase or
decrease W. And one can postulate shadow Pi where market Pi are lacking. But one
cannot maximize P*X in general, since the essence of general equilibrium theory is
that the P and X vectors are simultaneously determined and interdependent, and that
absolute P* have no meaning. All one can define is an N-1 vector of price ratios for
an arbitrary numdraire.The error may arise from a faulty legal analogy - the common
law grows by the accretion of precedent, the whole is the sum of the partial decisions
of individual courts. But general equilibrium is not the sum of its parts; it is an
interdependent and simultaneous system. The postulate that wealth maximization can,
let alone should, be an objective is a falacy of composition.
21 Archibald and Donaldson, Non-Paternalism and the Basic Theorems of Welfare
Economics (1976) 13 Can. J. Econ. 492 at 501-502.
2 Posner, supranote 18, at 135.
2
3 See note 16, supra. But divine inspiration helps. Dobb, supra note 4 at 23 quotes
Longfield, in 1833, "the laws according to which wealth is created, distributed, and
consumed, have been framed by the Great Author of our being, with the same regard
to our happiness which is manifested by the laws that govern the material world."
Longfield, an Irish judge who had turned to Political Economy, was reacting to the
threat to Property implicit in Ricardian theory. The phenomenon of lawyer/economists
clothing in economic language a transcendental argument for the status quo is not new.
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into the first issue, the range of j, when we think about what counts. So
long as Xj are identifiable economic commodities-shoes and ships and
sealing wax-that are consumed in identifiable amounts by identifiable people
or groups, the situation is clear. But the things that matter to people go far
beyond this. One might have-people do have-strong tastes for living in
certain types of society. Some value egalitarianism, others prefer inequality.
Values are placed on collective perceptions-military strength, athletic
fitness, godliness. At the micro level, your church-going behaviour may
affect my well-being. The Moral Majority in the U.S. is a dramatic example
of a group with very complex utility function interactions, who allege that
their welfare is affected by all sorts of activities by others which have no
discernable direct impact on them, and who argue that the state, that is, the
SWF, should respond to their preferences with regulations to control such
behaviour. This seems typical of most religions, and highlights the importance
of political processes in determining what shall count in the SWF and what
preferences are illegitimate or irrelevant to policy.
What is ironic is the political alliance between those who explicitly
adopt such an extended and complex view of the SWF with economic libertarians who at least claim to believe in (or hold as a value) a very simple
SWF of a type that makes direct regulation both unnecessary and harmful.
If there are no cross-utility function interactions, X does not affect U either
directly or through Uk, no public goods exist, and all commodities are welldefined and can be traded in markets with well-defined prices (these are the
only Xj that do, or should matter to people), and if the various behavioural
and technical conditions outlined above are satisfied, then the two theorems
of welfare economics hold and the SWF can be maximized by private market
transactions; but only if the initial property rights distribution is the one that
will yield that maximum. If not, of course, the best that markets can do is
to yield a set of U such that no U can be increased without decreasing some
U.; a Pareto point that will not, however, maximize W. There will be feasible
non-Pareto sets U that lead to a greater SWF.
In practice, insistence on the Pareto criterion, or of non-comparability
of utilities across persons, (the "moral monstrousness" of sacrificing one
person's interests for others') amounts to denial of the legitimacy of any
economic policy at all 2 4. And the advocacy of free markets independent of
24 "Mhe Pareto principle offers an approach to public policy likely to find favour
with those concerned to maintain the status quo," Peacock and Rowley, Pareto-

Optimality and the Political Economy of Liberalism (1972), 80 J. of Pol. Econ. 476

at 479. Posner (supra note 18 at 116) is appalled by the "moral monstrousness
associated with utilitarianism" insofar as it will "sacrifice the innocent individual on
the altar of social need" as well as refusing "to make moral distinctions among types
of pleasures." (Of course market-based systems make no such distinctions either,
you may pull the wings off as many flies as you can afford.) Put less rhetorically,
utilitarianism permits inter-personal utility comparisons, and the trading off of one
person's utility against another's. As, in practice, does any form of economic policy, or

any ethical system which attempts to justify such policy. Posner's position appears to
be that public activity of any feasible sort is morally monstrous - except presumably
that of adjudicating and defending pre-existing private property rights.
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any form of regulation without simultaneous advocacy of wealth redistribution logically implies acceptance, as a value premise, of whatever the
current (deregulated) distribution happens to be. (Hegel's children live on;
only now the market is the march of God through the world?) 2
Even then, however, the question of what constitutes economic commodities remains open. By assumption one may rule out such "fuzzy" Xj as
egalitarianism, or safe streets, or the nature of interpersonal relationships
(the reply to Titmuss' question, "Who is my stranger?" is "Everybody"). 2
This can be either a positive assumption (people do not really care about such
things, or a normative one (society should not respond to such preferences
any more than it should respond to those of sadists). But in analysis it
frequently takes on the positive-normative or creedal character mentioned
initially-despite counter-evidence one should accept the positive proposition
that people do not really care about non-marketable things, and, in any
event market-like interactions can be dreamed up to explain away any form
of evidence (such as families) that appears inconsistent with it.27 So one
should use only analytic tools that apply to commodity Xj and yield conclusions consistent with an all-commodity world. But what is a commodity?
Some reply, "anything that can be bought and sold," and claim support
from economics. But the claim is false. Economics does not say that a
market in babies would contribute to social welfare. Babies could be treated
as one of the Xj (means) or the U, (ends), as transactor or transacted
object, depending on the value judgments of the society in question.28 A
25 Gordon, supra note 11, at 483 makes the same point about Hayek: "If it is
meaningless to apply the concept of justice to the market order, then the market order
is neither just nor unjust. But the practical import, as far as policy is concerned, is that
the distribution generated by the market must be accepted, which is equivalent to
regarding it as just." Whatever is, is right. Here Gordon is referring to distribution as
a market outcome, not an initial property rights distribution, implicitly assuming away
hypothetical costless wealth transfers. Hayek's ultimate value of freedom, spontaneous
social order, is the march through the world not of God, but of some social evolutionary process, but it comes to the same thing (as discussed in Gordon, supra note 11,
at 479).
26
Titmuss, The Gift Relationship:From Human Blood to Social Policy (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1970).
27 A critical discussion of the universal self-interest approach is provided in Collard, Altruism and Economy: A Study in Non-Selfish Economics (Oxford: Martin
Robertson, 1978). The market-like interactions, super-games, and incomplete insurance
contracts necessary to rationalize altruistic behaviours and institutions are sufficiently
complex as well as implausible that one can no longer defend the self-interest postulate
by wielding Occam's Razor. Its appeal must lie elsewhere.
28
Posner asserts (supra note 18, at 139) that "the economist" would regard a free
market in babies as "much to be preferred to the present system." And so he may one can find some economist who will support anything. But not on the basis of economic theory, because that will not sustain the weight unless buttressed with philosophic
or political value judgments, with which other economists would violently disagree.
"The economist" appears to be a stalking horse for Posner's personal values, which
indeed he has to be, as his "morality is derived from the economic principle itself"
(i.e. wealth maximization). But that principle is simply a fallacy of composition
(supra note 18, at 135) and even if it were not empty, it would still lack any moral
content. Posner's "economist" is not a moral monster, but a moral midget - or less.
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society that treats babies as ends not means, however, will have to display
paternalistic (maternalistic) structures in part, at least, of its SWF. An erroneous judgment that "Economics" supports baby-trading may thus stem
from the assignment of normative significance to the positive question of
SWF structure-SWFs ought not to be paternalistic, economists ought not to
use paternalistic SWFs in analysis, and so babies ought to be objects, not
subjects.
Nor does object status necessarily imply commodity status. Societies
have prohibited market trading, directly or indirectly, in human blood or
organs, sexual favours, or land. And such judgments are neither right nor
wrong on economic grounds. The economist may point out that ethical values
involve tradeoffs too, and that refusal to treat an entity as a commodity may
require the giving up of other valued things, but he canot judge the tradeoff
itself.
But a tradeoff is not inevitable, Titmuss has demonstrated that in the
case of human blood, societies that treat it as a commodity to be allocated
in private markets show inferior performance on narrow economic criteria
of cost and quality to those in which it is not a commodity. 29 Indeed, it
appears that in health care generally (though not universally), full commodity status and private market allocation leads to inferior results on cost,
relative to societies in which commodity
effectiveness, and access dimensions
30
status is more problematic.
Even more generally, quite apart from the peculiarities of particular
commodities, it is simply a theoretical error to suggest that assignment of
commodity status to an object necessarily improves overall well-being.
Suppose that the production structure of an economy and the preference
structure of its participants meet all the requirements for private market
transactions to yield a Pareto-optimal point, except that trading is only
permitted in M-1 commodities. Markets in commodity M are, for some
reason, forbidden, even though M embodies no special ethical considerations.
If markets in M are then opened, it follows that those previously constrained
by the absence of markets will only transact in such new markets if the
transactions make them better off. Ceteris paribus, the opportunity to trade
would thus improve their welfare, without hurting others. But ceteris paribus
here does not hold. The critical assumption that trades between "T and "j"do
not affect "k" is false, the new market in M will affect prices and quantities
transacted in all other M-1 markets, and thereby the value of wealth (for
any given initial endowment) of all "n" transactors. Hence the Pareto-point
reached after market M is opened need not be superior to that reached in M-1
markets, even if commodity M has none of the special characteristics of
blood or health care. Indeed, the transactors in M themselves may be worse
29

Titmuss, supra note 26.
OEvans, "The Welfare Economics of Public Health Insurance: The Canadian
Example," paper presented to the Arne Ryde Symposium on the Economics of Social
Insurance, Lund, Sweden, September 1981, and "Is Health Care Better in Canada than
in the U.S.?", paper presented to the University Consortium for Research on North
America, Cambridge, Mass., December 1980.
3
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off. Free markets (and full information, and absence of externalities, and
perfect competition and...) ensure that transactors in M are better off after
transacting than before, given that an M market exists, but not that they are
better off than before the market was opened. The overall impact of the new
market on other prices and quantities may make them worse off. Thus it is
not a priori against the interests of individuals that they are prevented from
selling organs, or working in unsafe environments for higher pay, even apart
analysis may
from informational or externality issues. Partial equilibrium
3
yield invalid answers in a general equilibrum world. 1
Regulation, then, may be seen as part of the set of social processes
which respond to values embedded in the social welfare function but unattainable by, or unrecognized in, or even directly inimical to, the process of
arm's length commodity trading in unregulated markets. This is simply a
restatement of the traditional view, public regulation of economic activity
serves to remedy failures in markets as resource allocation mechanisms, with
the rider that the prior assumption that markets are the "normal" mechanism
and regulation is merely remedial is itself a pre-analytic value judgement.
More recent critiques of the regulatory process have pointed out that
this "traditional" view rests on two contestable assumptions, that markets do
indeed "fail" relative to the optimization of some plausible SWF, and that
the political process is capable of remedying such failures.
In contrast, the "deregulationist" school argues that although the
stringent conditions-technical, behavioural, or informational-for optimal
market performance would seem to be widely violated in the real world, yet
for a variety of reasons markets do not in fact "fail", or at least not often
and not by much. Simultaneously, there have developed economic theories
of the political process that characterize it in such a way that it is incapable
of responding positively to market failure. In the limit some appear to argue,
on essentially a priori grounds, that markets cannot in fact be improved
upon, there are really no market failures except those induced by public
intervention, and even if there were, regulation is by its nature unable to do
anything but make the situation worse. a2 Pangloss and anti-Pangloss.
The "regulate everything" and "regulate nothing" schools represent
polar cases; there is of course an intellectual and policy middle ground that
recognizes that social mechanisms for resource allocation do not in fact split
neatly into "private" and "public", but rather lie along a continuum from
totally unregulated private firms (if there are such) to public institutions
totally immune from market forces (if there are such) and a great deal,
probably most, of any society's work gets done between these poles. Furthermore all human institutions have characteristic virtues and vices, and
311 am indebted to D. Donaldson for this point, among others.
2An exception to this general position appears in the analysis of common
property resources. The most enthusiastic deregulators seem to recognize this form of
market failure, and though some would argue for a reallocation of property rights to
"enclose the commons", with or without compensation, others admit that such rights
may not be enforceably exclusive, at least with present technology or institutions.
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policy-making is a continual struggle for improvement in institutional design
under ever-changing circumstances. Thus one can simultaneously advocate
more regulation in one area, less in a second, and different in a third. But
in any case such advocacy will be built on a blend of positive propositions
(believed, more or less well established, positive judgments based on an often
unconscious blend of fact, experience, guess, and wish, and normative
assumptions about the good society or the SWF. And intellectual honesty, if
not adversarial efficacy, would seem to require continual and diligent effort
to separate and identify these different components of any position.
But the attitudinal poles are of considerable interest with respect to
their mix of positive and normative bases. The "deregulation" school seems
to enjoy the liveliest intellectual life at present, and alleges most energetically
its positive foundations and its freedom from arbitrary value judgments.
Since these claims cannot be true, the extent to which its policy recommendations serve as stalking horses for particular values is of interest. At
the other pole, the extensive regulatory structures that are in place in all
developed economies are all proposed and defended as remedies for market
failures and responses to a general or widespread social interest; that is, as
tending to increase the value of the SWF. Since this too is highly doubtful
on the evidence, it is again33 of interest to inquire what values or interests are
served in particular cases.
And finally, a point that appears to have been almost totally neglected,
the two poles may, in a perverse way, meet. If, as seems likely, complete
deregulation is not politically feasible, and if certain types of regulation"self-regulation", for example, or those that serve particularly powerful
constituencies-are much more resistant to removal, the net effect of a
blind drive to deregulate everything may be a much less conspicuous, and
perhaps reduced, level of regulation with substantially more harmful net
effects 3 4 That this concern is serious may be indicated by the enthusiasm
with which particular self-regulating occupations in the U.S. greeted the
new Reagan administration in 1981, despite its rhetoric of deregulation and
"free" competition which would appear to be a very serious threat to their
economic status.
This is a particular application of the general problem of the "Second
Best." Even if an economy meets all the conditions necessary for private
competitive markets to optimize the SWF, it does not follow that a partial
move toward more competition is an improvement. Half a loaf may be
worse than none, and the whole loaf is rarely attainable in this life at least.

3
See Hartle, supra note 14. See also, Trebilcock, Waverman and Pritchard,
"Markets for Regulation: Implications for Performance Standards and Institutional
Design," in Government Regulation: Issues and Alternatives (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1978): [A]n analysis of a limited number of actual forms of intervention indicate that eliminating market failures does not appear to be the sole or even
primary motivation." (at 28).
34 This important point is made by Hartle and Trebilcock, Regulatory Reform and
the Political Process (1982), 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. (forthcoming).
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The value foundations of theories and policy recommendations about
regulation are most clearly displayed when one considers it as a mechanism
of income/wealth redistribution. Economists in particular have long stressed
the importance of regulation as a way of suppressing competition and
thereby holding up the incomes of suppliers; they have given rather less
attention to its role in holding down particular incomes.3 5 Advocates of
regulation in general attempt either to ignore or to minimize redistributive
effects, or else to argue that such redistribution as occurs is justified-the
beneficiaries are "deserving", and society benefits as a result. On the other
hand, vulgar Marxists such as Stigler and his followers argue that redistribution is the primary purpose of regulation, and is demanded by the regulated for that purpose. 36 The most extreme deregulationists go further and
argue, in accordance with the two points above, not only that the wealth
transfer is unjustified, but that in fact it does not occur. The apparent
benefits are all eaten up in dead weight costs of acquiring regulation, which
is thus a policy making no one better off and some worse off. 37
The vulgar Marxist position has the virtue of being testable; one can
look to see if in fact regulation was initiated by the regulated and if they
appear to benefit. The answer appears to be yes to both, in many cases, but
some very obvious "no's" appear as well. The most strident opponent of food
and drug legislation in the U.S. is the drug industry-and they draw energetic
academic support from the Stiglerian school.38 But the argument that regulatory redistribution in fact meets social objectives is rather more difficult
to deal with. Middle-ground, wishy-washy regulatory reformers (of whom
I think I am one) can reply in several ways. First, the costs of redistribution
via market distortion are greater than via direct subsidy, and take the form
of both allocative distortions (consumer surplus triangles) and, in a number
of cases sheer technical inefficiency or waste (operation of the production
3
5Public intervention in the health insurance market in Canada has quite clearly
held down physicians' fees and incomes in a way in which private insurance in the
U.S. cannot, Evans, supra note 30.
36 Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971), 2 Bell J. of Eco. Mgmt.
Sci. 3. Marx described the (capitalist) state as the executive committee of the
bourgeoisie, a collective relationship, while Stigler and his followers treat it as a
sort of Mafia contracting with private organizations to sell favourable "regulations" to
the highest bidder. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation (1974) 5 Bell J. of Eco.
Mgmt. Sci. 335, notes the "odd mixture of welfare state liberals, muckrakers, Marxists
and free market economists" supporting capture theories of regulation. He suggests
that a carefully articulated neoclassical market analysis of regulation as a commodity which is competitively demanded and (despite appearances) supplied is superior to "interest groups" theory of political scientists which is, he argues, "devoid of
theory" (at 341), or presumably to the class-based Marxist analysis. Since he confesses
that "the economic theory is still so spongy that virtually any observations can be reconciled with it" (at 348), the superiority is not of performance. The advantage appears
rather to be its commitment "to the strong assumptions of economic theory generally"
(at 343) - i.e., conformity to a creed. Values attach to the choice of assumptions
themselves, regardless of the theory's predictive power.
3
7E.g. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation (1975), 83 J.Pol.
Econ.807.

38Peltzman, Regulation of Pharmaceutical Innovation: The 1962 Amendments

(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1974).
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function). If redistribution really is an objective, we could all be better off if
subsidies were paid instead. Second, the benefits of regulation become
capitalized (taxicab medallions, milk quotas) and go not to the apparent
beneficiaries (current suppliers) but to those who received the initial distribution of regulatory assets, who were issued medallions or milk quota fights,
without charge, when the regulation was introduced. Third, it is not in fact
true that society is aware of the redistributional effects; regulation is a way
of hiding transfers in a world of imperfect information.
To these, pro-regulationists may validly reply that the first response is
mistaken, it assumes that the SWF is defined only over commodities, not
processes. In fact, recipients of transfers strongly prefer them to be tied to
productive activity. Their welfare is lowered by direct transfers. Given this
structure, regulation may well be the optimal redistributive device. One can
counter this rebuttal in the positive domain, claiming that recipients do not
care, but casual empiricism suggests that this is wrong. Or one can move to
the domain of values-recipients' preferences should not count-and outside
that of positive analysis.
On the second point, it is true that some regulatory gains appear to be
fully capitalized, but not all are, and in any case, what of it? Society's
objective might not be to help farmers in general, for example, but to cushion
one generation during a period of rapid technical change that would otherwise lower their incomes sharply. If the desired adjustment is not continuous,
but in response to one particular set of events, then a capitalized regulatory
asset (production quota) is the appropriate form of wealth redistribution.
In any case, deregulation would certainly redistribute away from rights
holders, who may have bought these rights at market prices-what is the
justification for that?
The would-be deregulator seems to have two possible responses. He
could accept the capitalized redistributive effects of regulation as given, and
advocate a combination of deregulation plus buy-outs of quota or regulatory
rights. This removes the allocative distortions resulting from regulation,
legitimizes the capital transfer, and avoids penalizing those who bought
quotas at market rates. 39 The buy-out approach ought to be acceptable in
principle but as Hartle and Trebilcock point out it has in practice serious
40
disadvantages as explicit policy.
The second alternative, then, is to fall back on the information argument. Imperfectly informed citizen voters have accepted a form of redistribution (wealth plus utility from mode) plus associated costs of allocative
39The argument for deregulation without any compensation seems difficult to
justify. When made by those who simultaneously advocate compensation for all who
lose from any positive act of government it seems wholly without ethical or intellectual
merit. One can imagine alternating governments of different political stripe first
regulating some process with compensation, then deregulating without, indefinitely,
until all wealth lay with the "victims" of regulation! But what is regulation and what is
deregulation? Again a prior assignment of rights (natural, presumably) is being assumed
external to the political process.
40
Hartle and Trebilcock, supra note 34.
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distortions that they did not in fact want. As Hartle and Trebilcock point
out, this does not imply imperfectly informed policy-makers; they are likely
to be very well informed indeed. But their calculations must be based on
election probabilities as well as, or instead of, their perception of the public
interest. Thus the imperfect information argument forces on the policy
analyst/advocate the task, not of advising the politician, but of educating
the voter.41
For the absolute deregulator, however, there are at least two dilemmas.
First, if he accepts the imperfect information argument, it is difficult to
argue simultaneously that transactors have all the information necessary to
make markets work. Fully informed (or very informed) economic man and
ill informed (or stupid) political man have somehow to be crammed into the
same physical body. Once widespread ignorance about the effects of particular regulated markets is accepted, perfection of unregulated markets looks
a bit schizoid. It looks more like a postulate based on faith-normativepositive-than an empirical conclusion of judgment. Of course it is always
possible to argue that redistribution in general or of various types should
not occur.
Secondly, however, the capitalization of redistributive gains exposes a
serious weakness in the argument that all redistribution is eaten up in efforts
to acquire the regulatory "assets." In the case of production quotas, it is
necessary to assume that lobbying efforts use up resources just equal to the
capitalized value of the quotas, or that bribes (of the same value) are
competed for by politicians who in total invest real resources in seeking
election just equal to the value of bribes expected. All rents get dissipated.
Similarly in the case of non-marketable assets such as access to a profession, the capitalized value of above market earnings due to restricted
access is assumed to be dissipated in efforts to secure access. If access is
free and prices are regulated, entry dissipates the rents.
The problem is that such behaviour again depends on a peculiar
assumption about the structure of information. Aspiring professional entrants
are assumed to have excellent information on future product/service supply
and demand conditions, so as to predict discounted rental streams, but not
about present conditions in the "regulation" market-perfect farsightedness
and near term blindness. For if all applicants were fully informed, about the
market for "regulation" as well, they would know each other's probabilities
41 "[B]y influencing voter knowledge and understanding, and hence voter decisions,
the insights of economic research (and social science research generally) can be brought
to bear on the ultimate decision making process. Indeed these direct effects of new
information may be much more effective than direct information provision to bureaucrats and politicians." Id. at 48. Unfortunately, as Keynes pointed out, "the ideas of
economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are
wrong (my emphasis), are more powerful than is commonly understood." General
Theory of Employment Interest and Money (London: MacMillan, 1971) at 383. One
would indeed be an optimist to claim that the pamphleteering efforts of economists,
taken in total, have made a positive contribution to economic policy in the 1970's, at
least in the English-speaking world. But there may be no alternative.
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(conditional upon effort) of securing entrance. They could then calculate
who the winners would be, and once everyone knew this, no one would go
to any extra effort. The same holds for lobbyists and bribable politicians,
except that to be seen by others to be bribable, or to be lobbying energetically, can lower one's effectiveness. "Economic" theories of the political process
are not compatible with perfectly informed voters!
Of course information is very far from perfect, which is why people do
study hard to get into medical school. But quite apart from whether this
activity is a dead weight loss (surely another value judgment, education is
not built on consumer sovereignty!), once one admits imperfect information as
a critical component of the "rent-seeking" process then the dead weight
loss is no longer determined by the value of the discounted rental stream.
4
It can be higher or lower depending on particular conditions. 2
If regulatory benefits, such as entry to restricted markets, were distributed by lottery, and tickets were auctioned off on the basis of otherwise
unproductive effort, then one might expect ticket prices and dead weight
costs to reflect buyers' estimates of the expected value of the discounted
rental stream. But no real-life examples of such a mechanism come to mind.
This is not to say that regulation will not generate dead weight losses,
obviously it can and does. But the argument that these dissipate all positive
redistributional effects rests on implicit informational and structural assumptions about the regulatory process that have no obvious face validity and
seem rather to be imposed in order to yield a conclusion desired on other
grounds.
The ostensible justification of almost all regulation, however, is not
wealth redistribution per se but general improvements in well-being, serving
the public interest, however loosely defined. The regulatory activity is
proposed as increasing the value of the SWF, quite apart from any incidental
redistributive effects it may have. Such increases may result either from the
remedy of explicit market failures that constrain private unregulated transactions to sub-optimal results, or from the pursuit of more general social
goals, forms of Xj that are valued but cannot be treated as commodities
and traded in markets.
In the process, of course, there will usually be some redistribution of
income or wealth as regulation creates and destroys property rights. But such
redistribution is considered as a side effect, if at all, with some implicit or
explicit assumption that, since the overall SWF is to be increased, gainers
could afford to compensate losers (though they probably won't). And though
common, redistributive side effects do not necessarily follow. Schelling
42 The problem is not merely that the relation becomes imprecise or subject to
error. Rents may be systematically above the dead-weight cost of their acquisition,
depending on the characteristics of the activity or regulation in question, and may
remain so more or less indefinitely. They may also be systematically below, if there are
continuing biases in entrants' forecasts, as Adam Smith suggested was the case for
would-be barristers. In the professions, each would-be entrant is a new individual
(there's one born every minute) so the experience of others cannot be assumed to correct expectations.
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analyses a number of social processes involving interactive decision-making
(such as "prisoners' dilemmas") in which regulatory constraints can make
programs in
everyone involved better off. 43 Universal compulsory insurance
44
the presence of adverse selection are a prominent example.
There are several forms of market failure that give rise to arguments for
regulatory intervention. External effects, natural monopoly (or, more
generally, structurally imperfect competition), asymmetry of information
between transactors, and the more shadowy "destructive competition" are
usually included in such a list.4 5 In each of these situations, we find the
dual problem that "vulnerable interests," as the Professional Organizations
Committee described them, may be unable to protect themselves in private,
arms' length market transactions, 4 6 and that the outcome of such transactions
can be shown to be inefficient in the Paretian sense as well. Those interests
benefitting from the outcomes of the allegedly imperfect, unregulated market,
who would suffer from regulation, could be compensated (although they
probably won't be), and the vulnerable interests would still be better off.
The analysis of such situations could, and does, fill many books. As in
the redistribution case, however, assumptions about information and preanalytic value judgments about process and about wealth distributions seem
to play a critical role in determining the outcome of such analysis.
The "deregulationist" school denies either the existence of market
failure, or its remediability by public regulation. And their arguments seem
to turn on judgments about information. Debates over consumer protection,
or occupational health and safety, for instance, usually find the deregulationists assuming, openly or hidden in the equations, fully informed consumers/workers who knowingly accept hazards and are compensated,
through competitive market processes, for doing so. No effort is made to
determine if transactors really are fully informed. Instead they represent
an apparently positive but really, I think, normative assumption about how
people ought to behave.
In some cases learning processes of one form or another are tacked onto
the model to argue that market interactions will lead to transactor learning
and thus full information in the "long run", but this occurs only in a world
of stable parameters and arbitrarily long-lived transactors. Both Heracleitus
and Keynes are relevant in rebuttal, there are several levels of meaning to:
"In the long run we are all dead." In fact what such arguments boil down to
is a judgment that transactors are likely to be adequately, if not perfectly,
43

Micromotives and Macrobehaviour (New York: Norton, 1978).
Evans, supra note 30; see also Rothschild and Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976), 90
Q. J. of Econ. 629 and Wilson, A Model of Insurance Markets With Asymmetric
Information, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper #432, Yale University, June 29,
1976.
45
Trebilcock, Waverman and Pritchard, supra note 33.
46 Ont., Ministry of the Attorney-General, Report of the Professional Organizations Committee (Toronto: n.pub., 1980) at 7-11.
44

19821

Slouching Toward Chicago

informed, and in any case better informed than a regulator could be. This
may be true in particular cases, but is obviously false in others-unless
consumers' interests are assumed to be revealed only by their actions, a
version of the Pangloss gambit. People undergo (and in the U.S. pay for)
"unnecessary" removal of healthy organs because of the peace of mind this
brings?... 47 The assumption of full transactor information as a general
postulate by deregulationists marks it as a normative-positive postulate, an
article of a creed.
The analysis of imperfect competition and natural monopoly similarly
depends on informational assumptions. It has been pointed out that the case
for regulating natural monopolies disappears if perfect information is taken
to its logical limit, because spot contracts can be negotiated between consumers and producers specifying all the preset and future behaviour of the
monopolist. Moreover, since all relevant information is universally shared,
there will be no difficulty in assembling large nufibers of transactors on both
sides of the market. One can auction off rights to control a natural monopoly
for example, or the constraining features of a structurally imperfectly competitive market, and there will be large numbers of bidders in such an auction
because no person or group has inside information. 48
This argument is useful in turning attention from production structures
to information structures, and demonstrating how powerful (and implausible)
is perfect information. Counter-arguments are then framed in terms of incomplete rationality/calculability, incomplete foresight, first-mover advantages which lead to small-numbers problems of negotiation and long-term
administered contracts, and the public oversight of private "regulation. ' ' 49
Arguments against regulation of monopoly, as against anti-combines activity,
rest inter alia on the assumption that all markets are effectively spot markets
with large numbers of potential buyers and sellers, even though at any point
they are supplied by one, a handful, or even one. All supply curves are
elastic at or above the present price-if not immediately, then soon; and the
hypothetical entrant, implied by perfect information, is always there to make
apparently imperfect markets competitive. But the hypothetical entrant is
seen clearly only with the eye of faith; lacking such faith one becomes concerned with grubby details of entry barriers, negotiating costs, pre-commitment, and the dynamics of market structure. Some imperfect markets, left
alone, may generate self-correcting tendencies, others may not. And the
costs of unregulated imperfection vary dramatically, from the cosmetologist
to the neurosurgeon, or from monopolies in paper clips to monopolies in oil.
It may seem paradoxical, and is certainly ironic, that among the most
4

7Pauly, What is Unnecessary Surgery? (1979), 57 Milbank Memorial Fund
Quarterly 95.
48Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? (1968), 11 J. Law & Econ. 55.
49 Williamson Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New
York: The Free Press, 1975): Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts
(1976), 7 Bell J. of Eco. Mgmt. Sci. 426; Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics:
the Governance of Contractual Relations (1979), 22 J. Law & Econ. 233.
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energetic advocates of deregulation and reliance on private markets, we also
find considerable apparent concern for problems of imperfect information.
This would appear inconsistent with the statement that the absolute deregulationist position rests on very strong and implausible information
assumptions.
But the conflict is more apparent than real. Perfect information, of the
sort possessed by LePlace's Demon, is inaccessible to human actors at least.
Recast in relative terms, the relevant questions are what sorts of information
are generated by different institutional frameworks, and how will transactors
behave in the presence of imperfect information? The deregulationist assumptions appear to be two-fold: that private markets will in fact generate information which, if not perfect, is the best available given its
cost, and that transactors will act on the best available information as
if it were perfect. The recognition that information is not perfect in an
absolute sense then becomes a way of dealing with empirical evidence suggesting market failure. Observations of price dispersion, or failures of
markets to clear (unemployment) are no longer prima facie evidence of
failure; they may be consistent with the smooth functioning of markets in all
goods, including information. It is also a weapon against public regulation,
in that public agencies may be alleged not to have adequate information to
regulate effectively.
Of course neither of the above two assumptions holds in general. In
conditions of extreme information imperfection, transactors do not act as
if they were fully informed, they enter into various forms of non-arm's
length and non-market arrangementsr5 Moreover, information is not a
commodity, or if we choose to call it one, it is not a commodity with the
characteristics that give private markets an advantage in its efficient allocation. Markets are quite good at producing efficient amounts of some kinds
of information; they are very bad at producing others. One can point to
numerous examples, many discussed elsewhere in this volume, of the failure
of private markets in the production of information.
If one ignores these difficulties, however, and assumes, in the absence
of theoretical support and in the face of counter-evidence, that private
markets always do yield optimal, if not perfect, information levels, this is
equivalent to the assumption of perfect information. Imperfect information is
costly, but private unregulated markets minimize these costs-by assumption.
A more plausible approach is surely to recognize that imperfect information
is a problem under any system of institutions for resource allocation. Better
information is costly, but no one set of institutions can be assumed a priori
to have informational advantages in all settings.
Of course the pro-regulationist, in particular industries, is not concerned
with general cases. He usually has a lively appreciation for the private, as
50

Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. (1963), 53
Am. Econ. Rev. 941, explains the formation of the professional agency role in these
terms.
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well as the public, benefits that flow from regulation. The Stiglerian Marxist
is frequently right. The contrast is particularly striking between directly
regulated and "self"-regulating occupations, in terms of the balance of public
and private interests served. Self-regulators take care to suppress competitive
behaviour within the occupation, and strive to prevent the development of
other competitive occupations. Directly regulated occupations show a much
richer role structure. Self-regulators see "continuing competence" as a
combination of service quality, public relations, and tax-free holidays; the
directly regulated have to pass periodic re-examination. Detailed examination
of the regulations imposed by self-regulating occupations provides numerous
examples of measures promoting the interests of the occupation or its members, independently of or frequently in conflict with the interests of consumers or the wider society,' The surrounding rhetoric frequently alleges
or takes for granted that whatever is good for the self-regulating group is
by definition good for everyone else-the doctrine of Engine Charlie Wilson,
or General Bullmoose.
But though regulation frequently serves the interests of the regulated,
it does not follow either that it always does so or that it only does so. The
irony of the more articulate deregulators in the United States assisting the
pharmaceutical industry in its attack on Food and Drug Administration regulations was noted above, to say nothing of the Canadian oil industry's attitude to the National Energy Programme! And arguments for deregulation
of physicians fall on deaf ears, because the public at large feels that it
benefits from such regulation. It is probably right; deregulationists in this
52
field tend to ignore quality issues or to offer pie-in-the-sky alternatives.
Similarly the argument that airline safety can be assured by the travelling
public's learning to avoid unsafe lines appeals only to those who take the
train. In this case, as in medicine, information is costly to have as well as to
get, and non-compensable irreversibilities enter in a non-trivial way.
The scope for discussion of particular regulatory cases, and consideration of the balance of positive and normative judgments involved,
seems almost endless. But behind myriad specific judgements of fact and
value that inform (or cloud) debates over regulation there do seem to be

51 Evans and Stanbury, Occupational Regulation in Canada, University of Toronto

Law and Economics Workshop Series WS-3-17, (April 1981).
62 Few non-economists have been comfortable with Friedman's argument, prepounded in Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), that
unregulated health professions would have evolved, under market pressures, alternative
and at least as effective forms of quality control and consumer protection. His argument rests on a priori propositions about how perfect markets might function, linked by
assertion to actual markets, without supporting evidence of any sort. The discussion of
the "quality" problem in professional services in Muzondo and Pazderka, Professional
Licensing and Competition Policy: Effects of Licensing on Earnings and Rates-of-Return

Differentials (Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1979), similarly rests
on assertion and wishful thinking. The contrast with the careful approach to this central
problem in Trebilcock, Tuohy and Wolfson, Professional Regulation [a Staff Study

prepared for the Professional Organizations Committee] (Toronto: Ministry of the
Attorney-General, 1979), is striking.
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certain abiding values. Articles of a creed can be discerned, even if the
whole creed is still unclear. The hypothetical entrants, the generality of transactor information if not now then soon, the peculiar mix of "perfect information" with specific forms of blindness, the limited cost and reversibility of error, the commodity-like status of all relevant utility function
arguments, the absence of utility function interaction among transactors, all
represent positive propositions that are accepted on normative grounds,
which have limited, or no, empirical support but which ought to be believed.
Behind these, presumably, are more fundamental values, of which a
central one may be a peculiarly asymmetric attitude toward coercion. The
deregulationist school, or the Plutonian heresy, seem to have a horror of
coercion by force. Regulation, the authority of the state resting ultimately
on the public sword, is thus at root immoral, with one monumental exception. As pointed out by Steineer, the libertarian quandry is precisely that all
property rights themselves rely on this same sword, not on the consent of
those constrained to respect such rights. 3
But to those who do not possess sufficient property rights to sustain life
independently, the negotiations surrounding transactions may become indistinguishable from force. This point seems to be passed over in silence,
or dealt with implicitly by the assumption that all markets are competitiveor will become so before starvation sets in. The final solution, of simply
dropping such unfortunates from the SWF, is one that only a few have been
willing to recognize. Posner faces up to this.54 But he, like the pro-market
school generally, seems not to realize that exchange relationships are noncoercive only if one can choose not to participate. In technical terms, the
initial pre-trade resource endowment must sustain the transactor. All participants must, like independent peasant proprietors, be able to live off their
own. When this is not true, and some must trade to live while others need
not, "free" exchange may, depending on market structure, be powerfully
coercive. Marx stressed this point, as did Adam Smith. 5 But it has apparently been missed by those who call on his name without reading him.
At this point, the morality of the process whereby a particular structure
of property rights has emerged becomes crucial. It appears that insofar as
particular current public regulations can be identified as a source of such
rights, then they are not legitimate - deregulate regardless of the distributional consequences. But there seems no corresponding moral obligation
to investigate the historical roots .of current property rights, particularly
ownership of physical capital. Marx's interest in "primary accumulation"
would seem to be critical also to deregulationists, but in fact the sources of
present rights are either passed over in silence or dealt with by assertions
Libertarian Quandary (1980), 90 Ethics 257.
supra note 18, at 135. Actually Posner drops those whose post-trade
resources do not sustain life. For those whose endowment (such as labour but no
capital or land) requires them to trade, the outcome of that trade becomes a life or
death matter. Whether they are in or out of the SWF depends on market outcomes.
55 The Wealth of Nations (London: J.M. Dent, 1910) at 59.
53A

54Posner,
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lacking any historical support. 56 This is a serious omission, since the position,
"Regulate only with compensation, deregulate without, '5 7 must imply a
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate property rights. By definition,
those acquired as a result of regulation are illegitimate-all the rest are legitimate. Such wholesale ethical ratification of a historical process with some
distinctly unsavoury components cannot be the result of mere ignorance.
Moreover, the morality or immorality of the process of rights allocation,
its basis in consent or coercion, does not depend only on whether it occurred
today or yesterday. Coercion by (public) force is immoral, coercion by fraud
or private force is apparently not. Of course extortion or fraud as defined
by the law is presumably immoral, since it is at least illegal-if it can be
proven and redressed, not in some ideal judicial world but in the reality of
imperfect information and constrained litigious and judicial resources. But
the redistribution that occurs when there is systematic informational asymmetry in a transaction is apparently moral---caveat emptor (or in some
cases vendor). The stress placed in the creed on assumptions about learning processes or institutional evolution to redress such situations suggests
a certain unease at this point, or at least a concern that this value may not
be widely shared. But it seems apparent that as an underlying value premise,
redistribution via deceit is at worst a venial sin compared with the mortal
sin of regulation.
These asymmetric attitudes toward public and private coercion, force
and deceit, find expression in what Archibald and Donaldson call the "Junior
Chamber of Commerce Social Welfare Function." Any activity carried out in
the private sector (for which no one is convicted) increases the SWF; any
carried out in the public sector (possibly excepting those that increase the
security of private property rights) reduces the SWF.- 8 The task of the
analyst in any particular case is merely to explain how.
It is less clear whether the distribution of income and wealth is itself a
value, or whether the value judgments cover only the process of rights
allocation. Clearly egalitarianism is not a value, but is inequality valued for
G6 Several references in Posner, supra note 18, suggest that he is aware of the
problem, but his responses are trivial: "lawfully obtained wealth is created only by
doing things for other people... in a well-regulated market economy" (at 132.)
There is a fine confusion between what would happen in an ideal world and what did
happen historically. Similarly "lawfully" may mean in accordance with a moral law, or
simply that no one was convicted. Elsewhere (at 123) the market's response to a
buyer's offer for a necklace is given ethical significance because "the buyer's $10,000
was in all likelihood accumulated through productive activity." (my emphasis) Likely
to whom? It is rather a shaky foundation for an ethical system! One does not have
to assume that all primary accumulation is the result of force and fraud, or that
property is theft, in order to recognize that such activities played a prominent part
in the historical process of rights accumulation. (e.g. Myers, A History of Canadian
Wealth (reissued Toronto: James Lorimer, 1972, originally Chicago, 1914.) And to
assert that present accumulation proceeds solely by "understanding and appealing to the
needs and wants of others" (at 136), one must be either naive, or worse.
57
1 pstein, supra note 15.
5
8U.B.C. oral tradition. This seems in fact to be the core of Epstein's argument
(id.) and of Posner's (supra note 18).
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itself, or only as the result of a valued process? Most of the deregulation
rhetoric is over process, but the fundamental blind spots as to the role of
coercion in primary accumulation, in defense of current patterns, or when
carried on via informational differentials, strongly suggests that inequality
per se is an objective. This in turn could be a Rawlsian value, a preference
for inequality even when one is behind the veil of ignorance, but it seems
more plausible, given the above, that a particular pattern, the status quo
ante regulation, is favoured. Such a doctrine has marketable features, as did
the Apostles' Creed. There are always enthusiastic and generous benefactors
of a doctrine that supports the status quo-the Christian case was a bit more
complex.
Whether positivism, objectivity, "science", is also a value in itself is
also obscure. Again the rhetoric of positivism suggests that it is, but the
normative significance of the creed suggests otherwise. The white coat may
be an independent object of veneration, but its application indicates that it
is rather more of a cloak.
The usefulness of this cloak, however, depends on the specific values
to be defended. Myrdal, for example, argues:
Quasi-scientific rationalization of a political endeavour may be an effective propaganda weapon; yet its effect at the crucial time, when the ideal has acquired
enough political backing to be transformed into practical action, is in a democratic
setting almost always inhibiting and disintegrating. I make an exception for completely conservative strivings which seek no more than the preservation of the
status quo; from such a political standpoint doctrinaire thinking may be less
dangerous.59

It is ironic that while the content of science may be revolutionary, the meth-

odology is highly conservative. Nor is this effect confined to theorizing;
Tuohy observes that insistence on the most rigorous scientific standards in
cost-benefit evaluations of proposed public policy may so tie up the process
that nothing can be done. 0
In any case non-paternalism is clearly a value-one ought not to interfere with others' behaviour even if one does feel affected by it. This links
both to force-one should not impose one's preferences on others, and such
preferences are illegitimate (Richard Posner, meet the Moral Majority)and to wealth-one may distribute charity but there exists no obligation, no
noblesse oblige to look after others. Paternalism implies both right to interfere and obligation to help-both are denied.
Insofar as a particular wealth distribution is a value, and the strong
interest of deregulationists in terminating transfer programmes suggests that it
is, the Plutonian deregulationist closes the circle with the special interest
regulationist. Both pursue redistributional goals under a public interest cover
story. Both may serve other personal values as well. Neither are wholly
detached from the "public interest". There appear to be identifiable situations
in which regulation serves interests beyond or other than those of the regulated, general enough to be called public, and other situations in which only
59 Myrdal, supra note 6, p. xii [preface to 1929 edition].
60 Tuohy, supra note 9.
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the regulated are served. In some of these, again, dead weight losses may eat
up all the gains, so everyone loses.
Between these two poles, the special interest regulationist as he exists
in the mind of Stigler and the absolute deregulationist or Chicago Plutonian,
the advocate of wishy-washy regulatory reform has few fixed points for
guidance. And yet the inhabitants of this large middle ground do routinely
terminate their analyses with proposals for improvement and reform. Very
few students of regulation, or of economics generally, are motivated solely
by intellectual curiosity. Since the impossibility of deriving policy recommendations from analytic economics, of "ought" from "is", applies to such
reformers no less than to the Plutonians, one might well ask about the
source and content of their (our) values and objectives that are expressed
through economic analysis.
The question is not easy to answer. The values expressed through policy
recommendations must inevitably be diverse, overlapping, and to some
extent contradictory or confused. Following Gordon's criticism of "moral
monism," 6' 1 each analyst/advocate will generally have a number of values in
mind, consciously or subconsciously; and the relative weights on each, as
well as the range of values admitted, will vary across analysts. In attempting
to describe the value bases of non-Plutonian regulatory reform, one runs a
significant risk of isolating at best a confused and partial description of
the values of one analyst.
Since virtually all regulation redistributes property rights, any policy
recommendation implies the existence of values defined over this distribution.
The Paretian forbids any redistribution, effectively forbidding policy and
freezing the status quo. The cost-benefit analyst usually adds up benefits "to
whomsoever accruing," implying indifference to distribution. Explicit distributive weights can be inserted into the analysis, but usually are not. The
Plutonian values the status quo ante regulation, or the status quo post
deregulation, distributions (which need not be the same). The reformer
generally has a mild egalitarian bent, agreeihg with Simons' description of
extreme inequality as "evil or unlovely." This is reinforced by concern for
the political and social consequences of inequality; like Peacock and Rowley,
the reformer is concerned about the "threat to individual freedom.., from
concentrations of political and economic power, whether in the hands of
private citizens, of bureaucrats, or of the state.... [L]iberals are for the most
part committed to a more equal distribution of wealth than that which exists,
even in countries,.. . which operate a progressive tax system."6' The Plutonian, or Chicago liberal, rules out a priori the possibility of private
oppression. In their hearts, however, I suspect most regulatory reformers also
believe in the diminishing marginal utility of income, despite its analytic
problems.
Egalitarianism is, however, tempered by considerations of "transactions
costs" in a broad sense. Stability and predictability of individual wealth
81 Gordon, supra note 11, at 474.
02Supra note 24, at 480, 482. [emphasis added].
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positions is itself a value, though a value with interesting implications. If
unpredictable redistribution is a source of disutility when practiced by the
state, is it not equally so when it occurs through the market? The suggestion
that I have somehow "consented" when my private pension plan is wiped
out in the stock market, but not when my taxes are raised, strains the
meaning of consent out of recognition. 63 And stability is a frequent and
presumably legitimate objective of regulation. Redistributional objectives
must be balanced against the costs of change as well as incentive considerations.
Moreover there is usually some implicit judgment of "deservingness"inherited wealth is less deserved than earned wealth. Senior's initial justification of property income against the Ricardian attack made this distinction
clearly,'64 and few have been prepared to follow the Plutonians in treating the
use of inherited wealth as being consumption or investment on behalf of a
dead testator whose interests have as good a claim to protection as those
of any living member of society. Some societies engage in ancestor-worship,
and allocate resources to the satisfaction of the dead; ours does not.
This indicates the perceived social convention that underlies the
analyst's egalitarianism. The reformer bases recommendations, not just on
his own values but on a perception of social values. All developed countries
have progressive income tax systems, on paper at least, indicating a general
consensus in favour of moderating inequality. And attacks on the progressive
tax system have generally focused, not on this objective itself, but on its
alleged side effects with respect to efficiency and growth. Fev have been
willing to undertake a direct argument in favour of inequality as a value.
Apparently progressive tax systems may be more or less so in fact; a system
may have relatively few loopholes (Canada) or be so shot through as to
have little progressiveness left (the United States)-but its form reflects
what the society wants and believes it has. Ultimately the reformer must rest
his values on a perceived social consensus, though he may be distinctly
uneasy about what a democracy may do. 05 The Plutonian may in effect reject
democracy altogether, in favour of divine will, natural law, or sociobiological evolution, but the wishy-washy reformer is squarely caught on
the potential conflict between process and outcome values and can only
educate-or preach.
The regulatory reformer is thus likely to be more sympathetic to
regulation which rather protects the poor than further fattens the rich, though
bitter experience teaches that the latter frequently masquerades as the former.
It is a common critique of agricultural price stabilization or supply management that it favours the wealthy agribusiness, not the marginal farmer, or
of occupational regulation that it protects from competition the highest63 To choose A over B when no other options are permitted does not give A any
special ethical significance. If I demand "your money or your life," you do not "consent" in giving up your purse.
6
4 Dobb, supranote 4, at 104.
15 Peacock and Rowley, supra note 24, at 481 and Gordon, supra note 11, at
476-478.
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earning occupations in the economy, at the expense of their less wealthy
customers or potential competitors.
Apart from regulation as redistribution, however, the reformer, like the
Plutonian, is concerned with efficiency considerations. Traditionally, this
concern has focused on allocative distortions of the "welfare triangle" type,
arising from the effects of regulation in constraining supply and elevating
price. Increasingly, however, reformer and Plutonian are focusing on real
resource costs, technical inefficiency, associated with regulation. The triangles
do not appear to be very large, indeed in imperfectly informed and regulated markets they may well not exist. 6 But detailed study of regulated
industries indicates extensive resource mis-allocation in a technical sense.
Transport regulation leads to deadheading empty trucks and half-empty
aircraft competing by advertising. Professional regulation leads to pharmacists
"counting and pouring" and dentists filling teeth. The "high priced help"
uses the regulatory power to hold less costly competitors out of the market.
Farmers destroy large quantities of food. The most severe costs of economic
regulation turn out, on examination, to be sheer inefficiency and waste. The
perverse incentives that are frequently created by regulation lead either to
production off the production function, or to production on that function
that is non-optimal at current (or any plausible alternative) prices.
The problem is not so much, as the Plutonian analysis has it, that
dead weight losses are incurred in gaining access to rental streams created
by regulation, but that regulation distorts the production process itself. This
possibility is discounted on a priori grounds by the Plutonians; the simple
refutation is to go and look.
This brings out an important methodological distinction between the
reformer and the Plutonian deregulationist. The reformer places great weight
on specific information, on detailed investigation of what is actually happening in a particular industry. He is prepared to go down on the "shop floor",
into the grubby details of whether best practice technique is being used, and
if not why not, what are the actual incentives and constraints faced by the
key transactors, what sorts of information are in practice available or
unavailable, and how do people behave as a result. The deregulationist
rises above all this, preferring a priori analysis and indirect evidence, and
minimizing the use of specific information.. 7 Reliance on indirect information
I0 Evans, "Professionals and the Production Function: Can Competition Policy
Improve Efficiency in the Licensed Professions?" in Rottenberg, ed., OccupationalRegulation (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980); Evans and Stanbury,
supra note 51; Trebilcock et al., supra note 33; Evans and Williamson, Extending
Canadian National Health Insurance: Policy Options for Pharmacare and Denticare
(Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1978).
67 Stigler, in his remarks to the AEI Conference on Occupational Regulation, 1979
(see Rottenberg, supra note 66, at 348-354) specifically criticized economists who as
amateur technologists tried to understand the technical details of the industries or
occupations they studied. Such a criticism might carry more weight if one could
demonstrate, as Stigler did not, that economists were incapable of working with, or
learning from, people who do have specific technological information about the objects
of analysis. But of course they can and do. Stigler's position appears to be a plea for
ignorance, and for the disregard of all direct evidence. ("Don't confuse me with facts
... ") In a similar vein, the Reagan administration has slashed public funding for
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is presumably based on the assumption that all (relevant) direct information,
or at least all that is worth acquiring at current costs, is already optimally
embodied in the behaviour of the transactors being studied. But this
assumption, when formulated as other than a tautology, has neither
theoretical nor empirical support.
Detailed investigation of particular industries or markets will often lead
to the conclusion that much current regulation is harmful either absolutely,
or on balance, or relative to some conceivable alternative. But it requires
one to take seriously the issues and problems to which regulation responds.
Whether such a case-by-case, detailed investigation approach is likely to
be more effective in achieving change than a doctrinaire anti-public sector
stance based on a priori hypotheses is questionable; it may be true that
ignorance is strength. But the logical limit of the deregulationist approach is
pure quietism-if there is a "market" in public regulation then presumably
that "market" works as perfectly as any other, so whatever is is right in the
public sector as well. Reformers hold as a value, or certainly a creedal
assumption, that people of good will can in fact respond to public values
that to some extent transcend pure self-interest, and can work collectively
in public as well as in private to secure general social ends. 8 Conscious
amelioration, not just the spontaneous working out of social evolution, is
possible. And while there is no lack of examples or regulatory activity that
is short-sighted, harmful, or merely a cloak for private interests; there are
also examples of regulation that is widely considered successful, or at least
necessary, and with good reason.
Finally, most wishy-washy reformers appear to hold as a value a certain
conception of intellectual honesty that demands that insofar as possible
values be brought out in the open, not hidden in the analysis. Purely valuefree analysis may be impossible, but one can comment on the degree of
mixture rather than pretend to a spurious objectivity. And one can strive
towards objectivity; the impossibility of truly value free analysis does not
obliterate all distinction nor qualify strongly felt emotions as the equivalent
of careful intellectual effort. Nor should one apologize if the values thus
expressed are a bit vague and frequently in conflict; if they were not so, one
could not claim them as representative of the wider society.
Moreover, if the ethical scene is cloudy, there is a silver lining. If
regulatory reform must proceed as a series of special cases, with detailed
review of the facts and values involved in each, there appears to be a good
market for the services of analysts. Given the importance of the field, and
the acknowledged wide variation in the quality of work of practitioners,
some consideration of licensure seems an obvious priority.
socio-economic research, including that on regulation and its effects, except for "assessments ... in an abbreviated conceptual form only" ("Science and the Citizen: Lesser
Immediate Priority", Scientific American, September 1981 at 104). The less information,
the more reliance on a priorism, the less regulation. Ignorance is strength.
68 The distinction between levels of interest, which re-establishes the possibility of
a public interest, is discussed by Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural
Foundations of Economic Theory (1977), 6 Phil. and Public Aff. 317.

